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THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
JUVENILE MURDERER
MARTIN A. FREY*
Criminal intent is necessary to hold a person amenable to the
criminal law for murder. At common law a child under seven was
conclusively presumed to be incapable of entertaining such an intent
and no evidence could be received to show capacity in fact. A child
between seven and fourteen was presumed to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent but the presumption was rebuttable by a
showing to the criminal court jury that the child was of sufficient
intelligence to distinguish between right and wrong and did understand
the nature and illegality of his act. This presumption was extremely
strong at the age of seven and diminished gradually until it disappeared
entirely at the age of fourteen. A child over fourteen was in
substantially the same position with regard to criminal responsibility
as an adult. He was presumed to be capable of criminal intention and
therefore responsible, unless he could show that he was not of sufficient
capacity.!
Juvenile courts, special courts having jurisdiction over juvenile
* Associate professor, Texas Tech University Schoof of Law. The author acknowledges the
research assistance of Scott Bush and William G. Shaw, senior law students at Texas Tech
University School of Law.
I. W CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 6.12 (6th ed. 1958); J.
MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 34 (1934); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 837-40 (2d ed.
1969); Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REV. 364 (1937). For a
discussion of the common law and the criminal responsibility of mental infants, see Woodbridge,
Physical and Mental Infancy in the CriminalLaw, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 426 (1939); Note, Problem of
Age andJurisdictionin Juvenile Court, 19 VAND. L. REV. 833, 848-49 (1966).
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offenders, were created which professed as their objective an intense
desire to consider the child's welfare and provide for his redemption
rather than punishment for his misconduct? Behind this apparent unity
of purpose, contrary positions exist. The juvenile court jurisdiction may
or may not affect incapacity. If it does, the effect is to change the
common law age for complete incapacity and those ages between which
there is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity. If juvenile court
jurisdiction does not affect incapacity, then it may only postpone
criminal prosecution and punishment until the offender passes beyond
the juvenile court's jurisdiction?
I.

ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION OVER THE JUVENILE MURDERER

When a juvenile commits an act which would constitute murder
under state law if committed by an adult, the allocation of jurisdiction
between juvenile and criminal courts follows one of three basic
patterns. (1) The criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and the
juvenile court has no jurisdiction. (2) The juvenile and criminal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction up to a given age after which the criminal
court has exclusive jurisdiction. (3) The juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction up to a given age after which the criminal court has
exclusive jurisdiction. This last category further divides into those
states which permit the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction for juveniles
over a given age and those which permit no waiver.
A. Exclusive CriminalCourtJurisdiction
Seven state legislatures, having established the policy that the
juvenile murderer is to receive none of the benefits of juvenile court,
have excluded the juvenile murderer from juvenile court jurisdiction. 4
2. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 502 (Deering 1966); TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
2338-1, § 1 (1964); W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRINIES § 6.13 (6th
ed. 1958). See generally Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. FAMILY L. 121 (1965).
3. In State v. Mon.ahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954) compare the opinions of Justices Jacobs
and Oliphant.
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 957, 1159 (1953) (capital offenses); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.02(6)(c) (Supp. 1969) (offenses punishable by death after grand jury indictment
returned); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3203 (1956), § 9-3204(1) (Supp. 1969) (crimes punishable by
death or life imprisonment); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 52(c), (e) 78(b) (1966) (crimes punishable
by death or life imprisonment), construed in Prevatte v. Director Patuxent Institution, 5 Md. App.
406, 409, 248 A.2d 170, 173-4 (1968) and Briscoe v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 3 Md. App. 182,
183, 238 A.2d 204, 205 (1968); PA. STAT. tit. I1, § 256 (1965) (murder) underlying In re Gaskins,
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This leaves the criminal court with exclusive jurisdiction. However, this

exclusive jurisdiction may be restricted by the infancy presumptions.
The failure of the codes in these states to make mention of'any age

under which there is complete incapacity or any age under which there
is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity may be interpreted as a

recognition of the common law presumptions. Therefore a child under
seven, conclusively presumed to be unable to have formed-the criminal
intent necessary for murder, is excluded from criminal court

jurisdiction. The child between seven and fourteen is within the criminal
court's jurisdiction if the prosecution can rebut the presumption of

incapacity.
B.

ConcurrentJurisdiction
Eight states permit the prosecutor to determine whether the juvenile

murderer under a given age should receive the benefits of the juvenile
court or whether he should be prosecuted in criminal court. Above the
age when the juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
the criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction While the prosecutor may
decide to bring a child of any age to juvenile court, he is restricted in

his decision to bring him to criminal court by the age for complete
incapacity. In four states this age is seven, the same as at common
law.' In the other four, the age has been raised to eight,7 ten,8 twelvep
430 Pa. 298, 244 A.2d 662 cert. denied, 393 U.S. 989 (1968) (14 year old); S.C. CODE ANN. § 151103(9)(a) (1962) (crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment). Cf State v. Gorey, 235 S.C.
301, III S.E.2d 560 (1959) (where 13 year old was prosecuted for murder); W. VA. CODE
ANN §1 49-1-4(2), -5-3 (1966) (offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment), construed in
Smith v. Winters, 124 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1962). In Delaware and West Virginia, the abolition of
the death penalty has had no effect on this allocation ofjurisdiction. Brooks v. Taylor, 52 Del. 138,
154 A.2d 386 (1959); State ex rel. Campbell v. Wood, 155 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1967).Seegenerally
Foxworth v. Wainwright, 167 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1964) (14 at trial).
5 ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a) (1962) (18 and over); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-206,-224,-241,
-242 (1964). § 45-204 (Supp. 1969) (18 and over); GA. CONST. § 2-3901 (1945); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 24-2408(l), -2409 (Supp. 1969) (17 and over); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.62 (1969)
(18 and over), construed in State v. Stueve, 260 Ia. 787, 150 N.W.2d 597 (1967); NEB. REV.
STAT §§ 43-201(4),-202,-204,-211 (1968) (18 and over), construed in Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb.
70, 91 N W 2d 240 (1958) [14 year old with conviction indicated in Fugate v. State, 169 Neb. 420,
99 N W.2d 868 (1959), and Fugate v. State, 169 Neb. 434,99 N.W.2d 874 (1959)]; NEV. REv.
STAT §§ 62.020(I)(b), .040(!)(a)(5), .050, .060(1) (1967) (18 and over); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1175, -176(a) (1960), 16.1-158(i)(i) (Supp. 1968) (18 and over); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-98(b), I00(a)(4), -101 (1965) (18 and over).
6. The codes of Alaska, Nebraska, Virginia and Wyoming do not refer to criminal incapacity for
infancy and therefore can be interpreted as recognizing the common law presumptions. Cf. R.
PERKINS. CRIMINAL LAW 841 (2d ed. 1969).
7. NEv REV STAT. § 194.010(1967).
8 GA CODE ANN. § 26-302 (1953).
9. ARK STAT. ANN. § 41-112 (1964).
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and fourteen."0 In one state where the age for complete incapacity ends
at seven, the prosecutor is further restricted in that the child must be
fourteen at the time of criminal prosecution."
While concurrent jurisdiction permits the prosecutor to bring the
juvenile before either court, when the prosecutor chooses juvenile court
a question arises whether the juvenile court can relieve itself of
jurisdiction of whether jurisdiction is fixed by the prosecutor's choice.
Two states purport to permit the juvenile court to waive the case to
criminal court during the entire period of jurisdiction, although this
power is limited in fact by the complete incapacity of children under a
given age. 2 Two expressly permit waiver during the entire period of
concurrent jurisdiction." Two permit the juvenile court to waive the
case to criminal court during the latter period of concurrent
jurisdiction' 4 The others do not permit the juvenile court to waive.'
Therefore, under the third situation for the*early period of jurisdiction
and under the fourth situation for all cases, the criminal court will
acquire jurisdiction only if the case was brought to that court in the
first instance.
C. Exclusive Juvenile CourtJurisdiction
Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia give the juvenile court
exclusive jurisdiction up to a given age and the criminal court exclusive
jurisdiction beyond this age. 6 At either end of the juvenile court's
10. When IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.73 (1969) is read in conjunction with § 232.72, the age of 14
limits criminal prosecution.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176(a) (1960).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (Supp. 1969) (limited to children 7 and over by the common
law); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-224 '(1964) [limited to children 12 and over by ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-112 (1964)].
13. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.17, .72 (1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176(a) (1960).
14. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2410 (1959) (15 to 17), construed in Holmes v. State, 224 Ga. 553,
557, 163 S.E.2d 803,807 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.080 (1967) (16 to 18).
15. See NEB. RED. STAT. §§ 43-201 to -239 (1968); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-97 to -115 (1965).
16. ALA. CODE tit. 13, §§ 350(3), 351 (1959) (under 16); ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (1960) and
ARIZ. RED. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-202A, -223 (1956) (under 18); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-13(4),-3(17)(a),-3(17)(b),-4(1)(a),-4(1)(b) (Supp. 1967) (10 to 16); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-59
(1958), § 17-53 (Supp. 1969) (under 16); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1551(a)(1)(A) (1967) (under 18);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 333-8(a) (Supp. 1965) (under 18); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1803(l)(b)
(Supp. 1967) (under 18); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-1, -2, -7(1), -7(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1970) (females under 18; males under 17); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-802(b)(1), (c)(l), (e), -806(a)(1)
(Supp. 1968) (under 18); Ky. RED. STAT. ANN. § 208.020(1)(a) (1963) (under 18); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 13:1569(9), :1570A(5), :1571 (1950) (under 15); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
ANN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 52,72 (Supp. 1969) (7
to 17); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.2 Sec. 2(a)(l)) (Supp. 1969) (under 17); MINN. STAT.
ANN.

15, §§ 2502(4),2551-52 (1964) (under 17); MASS.
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range, special jurisdictional allocations occur. At the lower end of the
age scale, six states provide a minimum age for delinquency below

which the juvenile court has no jurisdiction.1 7 At the upper end of the
question of waiver arises. Eight states do not permit the juvenile court

to waive jurisdiction"8 while the other twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia do permit waiver for older juveniles. In eighteen,
the waiver age is specified within the waiver statute." In the remaining
260.015(5)(a), .111(i) (Supp. 1969) (under 18); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-02(g), -03(1),
-16 (Supp. 1966) (10 to 13), construed in Davis v. State, 204 So. 2d 270, 278 (1967); Mo. REV.
STAT § 211.031(l)(d) (1959) (under 17); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-602(2)(b),-603(a)
(1968) (under 16); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:30(11) (1964), §§ 169:1, :2(11), (III) (Supp. 1969)
(under 17); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-20 (1952), § 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1968) (under 18); N.M. STAT.
ANN §§ 13-8-26A(l), -28 (1968) (under 18); N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT §§ 712(a), 713,715 (1963) (7
to 15), construed in People v. Stevenson, 23 App. Div. 472, 262 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1965); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 110-21, -23(a), (b) (1966) (under 16); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.01(B)(1), (2),
.02(A), .07, .023 (A)(I), .25 (Page 1968) (under 18), construed in State v. Carder, 9 Ohio St.2d 1,
222 N.E.2d 620, 627 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1101(a), 1101(b), I 112(a) (Supp. 1968)
(females under 18; males under 16); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 419.476(1)(a), .478 (1967) (under 18),
construed in State v. Phillips, 422 P.2d 670 (Ore. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 14-13(C), -3(D), -3(F), -3(G)(6), -5(A), -28 (1956) (under 18); S.D. CODE §§ 43.0301, .0302 (1939)
(under 18); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-242(1), -242(2), -242(5)(a), -243(1), -250, -252, -264(I)(a), 265 (Supp. 1968) (under 14), construed in State ex rel. Donehue v. Russell, 221 Tenn. 609,429
S.W.2d 818 (1967); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, §§ 3, 5(a), 6(b), 12 (Supp. 1968)
(females 10 to 18; males 10 to 17); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-64(3), -64(4), -77(1), -79, -86,-105
(Supp. 1967) (under 18); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 632(a)(1), 632(a)(3), 633(a) (Supp. 1968) (10
to 16); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13.04.010, .020 (1962) (under 18); WIs. STAT.
A 1N §§ 48.02(3), .12(i) (1957), § 48.18(l) (Supp. 1969) (under 18). For a discussion of whether
the Colorado juvenile court has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, see Comment, Delinquency
Jurisdiction in Colorado: Garcia and the Children's Code, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 80 (1967).
California and North Dakota differ from the other 33 states and the District of Columbia in that
these two give the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction up to 18 and thejtivenile and criminal court
concurrent jurisdiction from 18 to 21. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 602-604 (Deering 1969);
N D CENT. CODE §§ 27-16-08,-09(1960).
17 COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(17)(a) (Supp. 1967) (under 10); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
119, § 52 (Supp. 1969) (under 7); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-17 (1953), § 7185-02(g) (Supp.
1967) (under 10); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 712(a), 713 (1963) (under 7); TEx. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN art 2338-1, § 3, 5 (1964) (under 10); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(a)(1)(Supp. 1968)
(under I0).
18. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-1 to-16 (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1753 to -74 (1968), §§ 17-53 to -74 (Supp. 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.561 to :1599 (1968);
Miss CODE ANN. §§ 7185-01 to -26 (Supp. 1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-601 to -633
(1968). construed in State e rel. Dahl v. District Ct., 333 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1958); N.Y. FAMILY CT.
ACT §§ 711-18 (1963), §§ 711-18 (Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 110-21 to 44
(1966), §§ 110-21 to -30 (Supp. 1967) VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 631 to 666 (Supp. 1968).
19. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1959) (14 to 16), construedin Duck v. State, 228 Ala. 138, 176 So.
2d497 (1965); CAL WELT. & INST'NS CODE § 707 (1969) (16 to 18); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 571-22
(a) (1968) (16 to 18); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1806(I)(a) (Supp. 1969) (16 to 18); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 702-7(3), (4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970) (females 13 to 18; males 13 to 17); KAN. STAT.
ANN §§
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ten, the statutes purport to permit the juvenile court to waive

jurisdiction to criminal court for all juveniles within its exclusive
original jurisdiction" although this power is limited in fact by the
irrebuttable presumption of incapacity for children under a given age.Pt
D. JurisdictionalSummary
The following chart (Table 1) depicts jhirisdiction based on age for

the offense of murder when the age at commission and the age at
prosecution fall within the same segment ofjurisdictional allocation.
ANN. § 38-808 (1964) (16 to 18); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (Supp. 1969) (14 to 17),
construed in Commonwealth v. Chase, 348 Mass. 100, 202 N.E.2d 300 (1964); MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178 (598.4) (1962) (15 to 17), construed in People v. Hoerle, 3 Mich. App. 693, 143

N.W.2d 593 (1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125(1) (Supp. 1970) (14 to 18); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 211.071 (1959) (14 to 17), construed in State v. Jalbo, 333 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Mo. 1960);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-15 (1952) (16 to 18), applied in State v. Loray, 46 N.J. 179,215 A.2d 539
(1965), andStatev. Tuddles, 38 N.J. 565, 186 A.2d 284 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-27 (1968)
(14 to 18); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1969) (16 to 18); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.533 (1)
(1967) (16 to 18); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-7 (1956) (16 to 18); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 2338-1, §§ 5, 6 (1964) (females 15 to 18; males 15 to 17), construed in In re Buchanan, 433
S.W.2d 787 (rex. Civ. App. 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-86 (Supp. 1967) (14 to 18); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.18(1) (Supp. 1968) (16 to 18). For a discussion of the Wisconsin waiver statute,
see Comment, Waiver ofJurisdictionin Wisconsin Juvenile Courts, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 55 1.
20. ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (Supp. 1969) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-222A (1956),
construed in Eymen v. Superior Ct., 9 Ariz. App. 6,448 P.2d 878 (1968); D.C. CODE ANN. § I 11553 (1967); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.070(1) (1962), construedin Heustis v. Sanders, 320
S.W.2d 602 (Ky. 1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2611(3) (1969), cf.State v. Hathaway, 161
Me. 255, 211 A.2d 558 (1965), (where 12 year old was criminally tried for murder); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:21-a (Supp. 1969); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page 1968); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (Supp. 1969); S.D. CODE § 43.0310 (1939); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.04.120 (1962). For a discussion of waiver in Ohio, see Comment, WaiverofJursdiction
in Juvenile Courts, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 132 (1969). See generally, Note, Separating the Criminal
from the Delinquent:Due Processin CertificationProcedure,40 S. Cal. L. Rev. 158 (1967).
In Tennessee if the child is under 14 and thejuvenile courtjudge has probable cause that he is
guilty of murder, the judge may remand him to criminal court. If the child is over 14, thejudge must
remand him to criminal court. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (Supp. 1969). Accord, State es rel.
Donehue v. Russell, 221 Tenn. 609,429 S.W.2d 818 (Tenn. 1967). In either case, the criminal court
cannot prosecute without receiving authorization from the juvenile court. In the latter, this is true
even though the criminal court is ultimately the only court that could proceed against the offender.
For a discussion of waiver in Tennessee, see Note, Problem ofAge and Jurisdictionin Juvenile
Court, 19 VAND. L. REV. 832,842, 850-62 (1966).
21. The District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Dakota and
Tennessee make no statutory reference to complete criminal incapacity based on infancy and
therefore the common law age of 7 appears to apply. Oklahoma codifies the common law age of 7.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 151(l) (1958). Arizona codifies the rebuttable presumption of criminal
incapacity under 14 which implies recognition of the common law age of 7 for complete criminal
incapacity. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-135 (1956). Washington raises the age to 8. WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.01.111 (1961).
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1. Delinquency Jurisdiction
Except for the seven states which exclude murder from juvenile court
jurisdiction, the majority give the juvenile court jurisdiction at the
earliest possible opportunity. Only six establish a minimum age for
jurisdiction (See Table 2).
TABLE 2

Number of
Age

Jurisdictions

0
7
10

38
2
4

No jurisdiction
at any age

7

Minimum age at which juvenile court
jurisdiction begins for murder

Except for the same seven states which exclude murder from juvenile
court jurisdiction, the vast majority give the juvenile court jurisdiction
until between sixteen and eighteen. The greatest concentration is at
eighteen. Three states, Illinois, Oklahoma and Texas, provide a higher
age for girls than for boys. This maximum age includes the age when
the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction ends, the age when the juvenile
court's jurisdiction ends even though it has been concurrent with
criminal court jurisdiction, and the age when juvenile court jurisdiction
ends although prior to that time it could have waived the case to
criminal court (See Table 3).
TABLE 3

Age

Number of
Jurisdictions

No jurisdiction

at any age

7

13
14
15

1
1
2

16

7

17
18
21

8
26
2

Maximum age at which juvenile court
jurisdiction ends for murder

122

2.
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CriminalJurisdiction

The minimum age for criminal jurisdiction is the earliest age at
which the criminal court could prosecute the offender for murder. It
includes the age when the criminal court's exclusive jurisdiction begins,
the age when the criminal court's jurisdiction begins even though
concurrent with juvenile court jufisdiction, and the age when the
juvenile court, although having exclusive jurisdiction, could waive to
criminal court. Two distinct groups exist: those that permit criminal
prosecution at age seven, the age under which there was an irrebuttable
presumption of incapacity at common law, and those that permit
criminal prosecution at a much older age (between fourteen and
sixteen) (See Table 4).
TABLE

4

Age

Number of
Jurisdictions

7
8
9
10

20
I
0
1

II
12
13
14

0
1
2
9

15

4

16
17

13
0

18

0

Minimum age at which criminal court
jurisdiction could begin for murder

The Relationshipbetween Juvenile and CriminalJurisdiction
The possible existence of juvenile or criminal jurisdiction is not
necessarily an "either-or" proposition. Both may exist for the same
age offender due to concurrent jurisdiction between juvenile and
criminal courts or to the allocation of waiver power to juvenile court.
The co-existence of juvenile and criminal jurisdiction is a fact in thirtysix jurisdictions. In thirteen, dual jurisdiction may occur for children
as young as seven, although in nineteen it begins between fourteen and
sixteen (See Table 5).

3.
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TABLE 5

Age

Number of
Jurisdictions

7
8
9
10
I!
12
13
14
15
16

13
1
0
1
0
1
1
9
2
8

Minimum age at which juvenile and
criminal court jurisdiction may co-exist

II

ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION OVER THE JUVENILE MUR-

DERER WHEN THE AGE AT COMMISSION AND THE AGE AT PROSE-

CUTION

Do NOT COINCIDE

All jurisdictions have at least one age line which separates one type
of jurisdictional allocation from another. A problem arises when the
offense has been committed when the offender was below this age but
prosecution did not begin until he was above the age.
A.

Exclusive CriminalCourtJurisdiction

In the seven states that give the criminal court exclusive jurisdiction,
the age line is the age below which there is an irrebuttable presumption
of incapacity on the part of the child. These states appear to follow
the common law age of seven." Insofar as the common law of capacity
or incapacity is concerned, the age of the accused at the time of the
alleged offense controls and not that at the time of the indictment of
the trial.
B.

ConcurrentJurisdiction

In the eight concurrent jurisdiction states, there are two and
sometimes three age lines. The first is between exclusive juvenile court
jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction.?3 In seven states the age is that
22 R PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 840 (2d ed. 1969).
23 Alaska (7); Arkansas (12); Georgia (10); Iowa (14); Nebraska (7); Nevada (8); Virginia (14);
Wyoming (7), For Iowa see IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.72, .73 (1969).
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below which there is an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity on the
part of the child. Since this deals with incapacity at the time of the
offense, the age at commission and not the age at prosecution should
control. In the eighth, Virginia, the age line is seven years above the
common law age for complete incapacity. Since this latter period does
not deal with incapacity at the time of the offense, the age at
prosecution and not the age at commission may control 4
The second line exists in two states and is based on the age during
concurrent jurisdiction when the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction
to criminal court. 5 The question is whether the juvenile court may
waive an offender who is now above the waiver age although the offense
was committed below the waiver age. This is not a problem of giving
the criminal court new jurisdiction since it already had existing
concurrent jurisdiction. On this basis, jurisdiction based on the age at
prosecution may be justified.
The third line is between concurrent jurisdiction and exclusive
criminal court jurisdiction.2 6 Does the juvenile court still have
jurisdiction to prosecute, even though not exclusive, once the offender
has passed what normally would have been the bounds of juvenile court
jurisdiction? Five states extend the juvenile court's concurrent
jurisdiction until the offender turns twenty or twenty-one 7 while the
other three give no extension!' No state extends the juvenile court's
jurisdiction beyond minority.
C. Exclusive Juvenile CourtJurisdiction
In the thirty-six exclusive juvenile court jurisdictions, there can be
from one to three age lines. The analysis can be simplified by
considering separately those states that do and those that do not
provide waiver.
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176(a) (1960). Note that this provision refers to the present age
of the offender and not his age at the time of commission of the offense.
25. Georgia (15); Nevada (16).
26. Alaska (18); Arkansas (18); Georgia (17); Iowa (18); Nebraska (18); Nevada (18); Virginia
(18); Wyoming (18).
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2409(1) (1959) (extended from 17 to 21); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 232.63, .64 (1969) (extended from 18 to 21); NE. REV. STAT. § 62.040(1)(b) (1967)
(extended from 18 to 21); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158(4) (1960) (extended from 18 to 21); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-100(b) (1965) (extended from 18 to 20).
28. ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.010, .290(6) (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-204, -224 (Supp.
1967); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-201(4),-202, -211 (1969).
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1. No waiver

Of the eight states that do not permit the juvenile court to waive

jurisdiction, the first line exists in four and is between no jurisdiction
and exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction.2 The remaining states place

no minimum limit on juvenile court jurisdiction. Since incapacity is not
involved because the problem is one of juvenile and not criminal court
jurisdiction, the question of whether the juvenile court has jurisdiction
once the child passes this age for prior acts must be answered on other
grounds. The legislative purpose in establishing a minimum age for

juvenile court jurisdiction would be of utmost significance.
The second line is between exclusive juvenile court and exclusive

criminal court jurisdiction. This line exists in all eight states although
the age at which the line is drawn differs? ° When the offender's age at
commission was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court
but his age at prosecution was such that had he now committed the
offense he would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the criminal

court, the allocation of jurisdiction varies. (1) Five states do not extend
the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Except for one,31 these states permit the
criminal court to prosecute once the offender has passed the age

separating juvenile from criminal court jurisdiction? 2 (2) Two states
extend juvenile court jurisdiction through minority. One permits the
criminal court to prosecute once the offender has passed his minority
29. Colorado (10); Mississippi (10); New York (7); Vermont (10).
30 Colorado (16); Connecticut (16); Louisiana (15); Mississippi (13); Montana (16); New York
(15); North Carolina (16); Vermont (16).
31 Mississippi does not extend the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 718502(g), -03(I),-15,-16 (Supp. 1968). However, Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-17 (1952) does provide for
complete criminal incapacity under 13, the age which coincides with the maximum age for juvenile
court jurisdiction.
32. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3(4),-3(17)(a), (b), -4(l)(a), (b) (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN.
STAT ANN. §§ 17-59, -65 (1958), § 17-53 (Supp. 1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10602(2)(b), -603(a), (b), -604, -610 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-21 (1966). The only limit on how
far back the criminal court may go is the age of complete criminal incapacity. Except for Colorado
which raised the age to 10 (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-14 (1964)), the common law age of 7 would be
applicable. Montana has codified the common law age for complete criminal incapacity. MONT.
REV CODES ANN. § 94-201(1) (1969).
33. The jurisdictional provision in Louisiana extends juvenile court jurisdiction to include the
minor between 15 and 21 who has committed the offense prior to becoming 15. LA. REV.
STAT § 13:1570(B) (1950). This provision is accompanied by one which requires the criminal court
to transfer these cases to juvenile court. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1571 (1968). Since there is no
required transfer when the person is 21 or over, it can be concluded that the criminal court may
retain the case and proceed with prosecution. The only limit on the criminal court is the age below
which there is complete criminal incapacity. This age is set in Louisiana at 10. LA. REV.
STAT. § 14:13 (1951).
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while the other does not. (3) One state vests the juvenile court with
exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the offender's present age 5 and
prohibits the criminal court from prosecuting once the offender passes

normal juvenile court jurisdiction age3
Comparing the age below which there is complete incapacity with the
maximum age for exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction, only three states
coincide (See Table 6).
TABLE

State

Colorado
Connecticut
Louisiana
Mississippi
Montana
New York
North Carolina
Vermont

6

Complete
Incapacity

Exclusive
Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction

10
7
10
13
7
15
7
16

16
16
15
13
16
15
16
16

Comparison of the age of complete incapacity
with that of exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction

Thus in five of the eight states, juvenile court jurisdiction merely
postpones criminal prosecution until the offender passes beyond the

juvenile court's authority.
2.

Waiver

Of the twenty-eight jurisdictions that permit the juvenile court to
waive jurisdiction, the first line exists in two and is between no
jurisdiction and exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction?7 Juvenile court
34. Thejurisdictional provision in Vermont extendsjuvenle court jurisdiction to include the
minor between 16 and 21 who has committed the offense prior to becoming 16. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, §§ 633(a), 634 (Supp. 1968). This provision is accompanied by one which requires the criminal
court to transfer all persons, regardless of whether they are presently below or above 21, to juvenile
court if the offense was committed when the defendant was under the age in which the juvenile court
had exclusive jurisdiction. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 635(a) (Supp. 1968). Since the criminal court
could not retain the case, it would have no jurisdiction to proceed. On the other hand, the juvenile
court would also have no jurisdiction to proceed once the offender reached his majority. This result
would be that neither could act.
35. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 713, 7 14 (a), (b) (1963).
36. People v. Oliver, I N.Y.2d 152, 134 N.E.2d 197, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1956) (14 at
commission-23 at trial).
37. Massachusetts (7); Texas (10).
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jurisdiction for prior acts could be justified since this does not involve
a question of incapacity. The remaining twenty-six place no minimum
limit on juvenile court jurisdiction.
The second line is within the exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction

period and represents the earliest age at which the juvenile court may
waive to criminal court. This line exists in all twenty-eight

jurisdictions? In fourteen where the minimum age for waiver coincides
with the maximum common law or statutory age for complete
incapacity, waiver may occur only when the offense was committed
during the waiver age?' In the other fourteen jurisdictions, the majority
base waiver on the age at prosecution and either expressly provide that

the age at waiver is the controlling factor"' or impliedly approve waiver
because their waiver provisions do not provide otherwise!' In those

states which prohibit waiver, statutes specifically provide that the act
must have been committed during the waiver age

2

The minimum age

for waiver then establishes a new maximum age for complete
incapacity !
38. Alabama (14); Arizona (7); California (16); District of Columbia (7); Hawaii (16); Idaho
(16); Illinois (13); Kansas (16); Kentucky (7); Maine (7); Massachusetts (14); Michigan (15);
Minnesota (14); Missouri (14); New Hampshire (7); New Jersey (16); New Mexico (14); North
Dakota (14); Ohio (7); Oklahoma (7); Oregon (16); Rhode Island (16); South Dakota (7); Tennessee
(7). Texas (15); Utah (14); Washington (8); Wisconsin (16).
39. Arizona, District of Columbia, Kentucky. Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Dakota and
Tennessee appear to rely on the common law age of 7. Oklahoma codifies the common law age of 7.
OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152(1) (1958). The other five states raised the age: Washington to 8
IWASH REV CODE ANN. § 9.01.111 (1962)]; Illinois to 13 [ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-1 (SmithHurd 1964)); Minnesota to 14 [MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.055 (1964)]; Texas to 15 [TEX. PENAL
CODE art. 30, § I (Supp. 1969)1; New Jersey to 16 [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:85-4 (1953)]. In addition to the fact that the waiver age coincides with the maximum age for complete criminal incapacity, Illinois, Minnesota and Texas expressly provide in their waiver statute that the act
must have been committed during the waiver age. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (SmithHurd Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125(1) (Supp. 1970), construed in State v. Dehler,
102 N.W.2d 6%, 701-02 (Minn. 1960); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, §§ 5(a), 6(b)
(Supp. 1969).
40. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1806(1)(a) (Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.533(1)(a) (1967),
construedin State v. Little, 407 P.2d 627 (Ore. 1965) (15 at commission- 16 at waiver).
41. ALA_ CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 333-13(a)(1) (Supp. 1965); MIcH.
STAT ANN. § 27.3178(598.4) (1962) construed in People v. Carlson, 360 Mich. 651, 104 N.W.2d
753 (1960) (age when child is accused in juvenile court is critical age); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071
(1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-27 (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-13 (1960); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 14-1-7 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-86 (Supp. 1967); WIs. STAT.
ANN § 48.18(l) (Supp. 1968).
42. CAL WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 707 (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. § 38-808(b) (Supp.
1968); MASS. ANN, LAws ch. 119, § 61 (Supp. 1969).
43. California (16); Kansas (16); Massachusetts (14). ButseeCAL. PEN. CODE § 26 (1955)
(provides a rebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity under 14).
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The third line is between exclusive juvenile court and exclusive

criminal court jurisdiction. This line exists in all but two jurisdictions,"
although the age at which the line is drawn differs. 5 When the
offender's age at commission was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the juvenile court but his age at prosecution was such that had he now
committed the offense he would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the criminal court, the allocation of jurisdiction varies. (1) Eleven states
do not extend the juvenile court's jurisdiction. These states permit the
criminal court to prosecute once the offender has passed the age
separating juvenile from criminal court jurisdiction!' The question then
becomes how far back may the criminal court go. In eight of these
states, the minimum waiver age corresponds to the common law or

statutory age under which there is an irrebuttable presumption of
incapacity.4

7

This age then becomes the lowest age to which the

criminal court may go back. In the other three the minimum waiver
age does not correspond to the common law or statutory age under
which there is an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity. These states

permit the criminal court to go back to the maximum common law
age for complete incapacity which is lower than the minimum waiver
age!8 The result is that offenders who could not have been brought to
44. In California and North Dakota, this line does not exist because the period of exclusive
juvenile court jurisdiction (under 18) is followed by a period of concurrent jurisdiction (18 to 21)
instead of exclusive criminal court jurisdiction. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 602-604(a) (1966);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08(2) (1960).
45. Alabama (16); Arizona (18); District of Columbia (18); Hawaii (18); Idaho (18); Illinois (17
for boys and 18 for girls); Kansas (18); Kentucky (18); Maine (17); Massachusetts (17); Michigan
(17); Minnesota (18); Missouri (17); New Hampshire (17); New Jersey (18); New Mexico (18); Ohio
(18); Oklahoma (16 for boys and 18 for girls); Oregon (18); Rhode Island (18); South Dakota (18);
Tennessee (14); Texas (17 for boys and 18 for girls); Utah (18); Washington (18); Wisconsin (18).
46. ALA. CODE tit. 13, §§ 350(3), 351, 363 (1959); ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (1960) and ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-202A, -223 (1956); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.020(l)(a) (1962); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2502(4), 2551 (1964), 2552 (Supp. 1970); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2151.23(A)(1), .25 (Page 1968); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 419.476(1)(a), .478 (1967); S.D.
REV. CODE §§ 43.0302, .0318 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-243(1), -252 (Supp. 1969); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, §§ 5(a), 12 (Supp. 1969); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.04.010 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.12(1) (1957).
47. Arizona (7); Kentucky (7); Maine (7); Ohio (7); South Dakota (7); Tennessee (7); Texas (15);
Washington (8). The Texas and Washington ages have been raised from the common law age of 7 by
statute. TEx. PEN. CODE art. 30, §§ 1, 2 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.01.111 (1961).
48. Although the waiver age in Alabama was 14 to 16 and the waiver age in Oregon and
Wisconsin was 16 to 18, the criminal court may go back to age 7, the common law age for complete
criminal incapacity. This result is due to the fact that these states base waiver on the age at
prosecution and not on the age at commission. ORE. REV. STAT. § 4 19.533(i)(a) (1967) expressly
provides that the age at waiver is the controlling factor. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958) and Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.18(1) (Supp. 1969) impliedly approve waiver based on age at prosecution because
their waiver provisions do not provide otherwise.
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criminal court or be waived to criminal court at the time of the
commission of the offense, could now be brought directly to criminal
court for prosecution due to his change in age. (2) Thirteen extend
juvenile court jurisdiction through minority. Seven permit the criminal
court to prosecute once the offender has passed his minority4 9 while the
other six do not? In the seven that permit criminal prosecution, the
question then arises how far back may the criminal court go. In three
where the minimum waiver age corresponds with the age below which
there is an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity, the criminal court
may go back to this age' Where the minimum waiver age does not
correspond with the common law age, the remaining four states permit
49 The jurisdictional provision extends juvenile court jurisdiction to include the minor between
18 and 21 who has committed the offense prior to becoming 18. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1551 (a)(2)
(1967); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 333-8(a) (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1803(2) (Supp. 1969);
MINN STAT. ANN. §§ 260.015(2), .111(1) (Supp. 1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:1 (Supp.
1970) (offense committed prior to becoming 17); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-26A(l) (1968),
construed in Trujillo v. State, 79 N.M. 618,447 P.2d 279 (1968) (17 at commission-24 at trial);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-77(1) (Supp. 1969). This provision normally is accompanied by one
which requires the criminal court to transfer these cases to juvenile court. D.C. CODE ANN. § 111552 (1967); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 333-9 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1804 (Supp. 1969);
MINN STAT. ANN. § 260.115(1) (Supp. 1969), construed in State v. Dehler, 102 N.W.2d 696,702
(Minn. 1960) (although no note of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260215(t) (Supp. 1969) is taken); N.M.
STAT ANN. § 13-8-28 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-79 (Supp. 1969). Since there is no
required transfer when the person is 21 or over, it can be concluded that the criminal court may
retain the case and proceed with prosecution. Although New Hampshire has no comparable transfer
statute, the same result may be reached by considering itsjurisdictional statute.
50. The jurisdictional provisions extend juvenile court jurisdiction to include the minor between
18 and 21 who has committed the offense prior to becoming 18. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 27, §§ 702-1,
702-2, 705-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969) (offense committed by boy prior to becoming 17 or by girl
prior to becoming 18 and with no kind of dispositional order available for adults); KAN. STAT.
ANN §§ 38-806(b), (c) (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.5) (1962) (juvenile court

jurisdiction terminates at 19); Mo.

REV. STAT.

§ 211.031(2) (1959) (offense committed prior to

becoming 17); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1102, 1112 (Supp. 1969-70) (juvenile court
jurisdiction terminates at 21 for males and 18 for females); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 14-I-5A, -6
(1956) These provisions normally are accompanied by one which requires the criminal court to
transfer allpersons, regardless of whether they are presently below or above 21, to juvenile court if
the offense was committed when the defendant was within the ages in which the juvenile court had
exclusive jurisdiction. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-815(d) (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.3)
(Supp 1969); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.061(2) (1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (Supp.
1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-28 (1956). Since the criminal court could not retain the case,
it would have no jurisdiction to proceed. This result is expressly provided in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
37, § 702-7(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970). On the other hand, thejuvenile court would also have no
jurisdiction to proceed once the offender reached his majority. The result would be that neither court
could act.
51. District of Columbia (7); Minnesota (14) (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.055 (1964)); New
Hampshire (7).
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Under this view, it becomes possible

for an offender, who at the time of commission could not have reached
criminal court, to be prosecuted criminally for his prior acts. In the
six states that do not permit the criminal court to prosecute once the

offender has passed his minority, criminal prosecution for acts
committed prior to the waiver age is also possible in three states,

although criminal prosecution must commence prior to majority.p (3)
Two states vest the juvenile court with exclusive jurisdiction regardless

of the offender's present agel Thus the criminal court may prosecute
only after waiver by the juvenile court. In both states, the juvenile court

may not waive when the offence was committed prior to the waiver
age

5

Comparing the age below which there is complete incapacity with the
minimum waiver age, seventeen of the twenty-eight jurisdictions
coincide (See Table 7).
52. Idaho (minimum waiver age of 16) expressly provides that the age at waiver and not at
commission is to control. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1806(l)(a) (Supp. 1969). In Hawaii (16), New
Mexico (14) and Utah (14), by not providing otherwise in their waiver provisions, impliedly approve
that the age at waiver is controlling. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 333-13(a)(1) (Supp. 1965); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-8-27 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-86 (Supp. 1969). The fact that acts committed
prior to waiver age may lead to criminal prosecution signifies that the minimum waiver age is not to
be taken as a new age for complete criminal incapacity. Instead, the age is procedural. The criminal
court may then go back to the common law age of 7. Hawaii and Utah codify the common law.
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 703-1,-2 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-41 (1953).
53. In Michigan, Missouri and Rhode Island the minimum waiver age does not coincide with the
common law age for complete criminal incapacity nor is there a raising of the common law age by
statute. In these states the waiver statutes do not specifically provide that the act must have been
committed during the waiver age. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.4) (1962); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 211.071 (1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-7 (1956). The conclusion is that the
criminal court may acquire jurisdiction on juvenile court waiver, up to the time when the offender
reaches his majority, for offenses which occurred prior to the juvenile court's waiver age.
In Illinois and Oklahoma the minimum waiver age does coincide with the maximum statutory
age for complete criminal incapacity. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-1 (1964) (age 13); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 152(1) (1958) (age 7). In Kansas the waiver statute specifically provides that the act
must have been committed during the waiver age. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808(b) (1964) (minimum
waiver age 16). Illinois has a similar statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1970).
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 72, 72A, 74 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-20
(1952), § 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1968), construed in In re Smigelski, 30 N.J. 513, 154 A.2d 1 (1959)
(defendant now 21); cf.Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942 (1955);
Note, Double Jeopardy and Due Process in the Juvenile Courts, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 756, 765
(1968).
55. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 119, § 61 (1965) permits waiver only when the offense was
committed during the waiver age. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:85-4 (1953) sets the maximum age for
complete criminal incapacity at 16, the minimum age for waiver. See In re Smigelski, 30 N.J. 513,
154 A.2d 1 (1959) (14 at commission-21 at juvenile court trial).
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TABLE

7

Complete
Incapacity

Minimum

Alabama
Arizona
California
District of
Columbia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

7
7
16
7

14

7
7
13

16
16
13

Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

16
7
7
14
7
14
7
7
16
7
7
7
7

16
7
7
14
15
14
14
7
16
14
14
7
7

Oregon
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

7
7
7
7
15

16
16
7
7
15

7
8
7

14
8
16

Jurisdiction

Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

Waiver
Age

7
16
7

Exclusive
Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction
16
18
18
18
18
18
17 for boys
18 for girls
18
18
17
17
17
18
17
17
18
18
18
18
16 for boys
18 for girls
18
18
18
14
17 for boys
18 for girls
18
18
18

Comparison of the age of complete incapacity with the age
of minimum waiver

In the eleven where maximum age for complete incapacity does not
coincide with the minimum waiver age, the allocation of exclusive
jurisdiction to the juvenile court merely serves to postpone criminal
prosecution until the child ages. In the three where juvenile court
jurisdiction is not extended beyond what was normally allocated, the
criminal court may prosecute once exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction
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ends for offenses occurring as far back as the common law age for
complete incapacity. In four the juvenile court's jurisdiction is extended
until twenty-one at which time the criminal court may then prosecute
for offenses occurring as far back as the common law age for complete
incapacity. In three states the juvenile court's jurisdiction is extended
to twenty-one and the criminal court may not prosecute above twentyone, the criminal court may still prosecute for offenses occurring prior
to the waiver age if the juvenile court waives to criminal court when
the offender is under twenty-one. The eleventh state is a special
situation since concurrent jurisdiction follows exclusive juvenile court
jurisdiction.

III.

THE CHANGE IN ATTITUDE

The change in attitude toward the juvenile murderer is reflected by
the upward shift in the age of complete incapacity (See table 8).
TABLE

Age

Number of
Jurisdictions

8

Jurisdictions

7
8

34
2

9
10

0
3

Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana

I1
12
13
14
15
16

0
1
2
3
2
4

Arkansas
Illinois, Mississippi
Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota
New York, Texas
California, Kansas, New Jersey,

Nevada, Washington

Vermont
Maximum age for irrebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit
murder

The shift in Illinois occurred in 1961 when the age was raised from
ten to thirteen."6 Iowa revised its juvenile court act in 1965 and
56. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
In approaching the redraft of these provisions the Committee sought to accomplish two
purposes: first, the raising of the minimum age of criminal capacity; second, the elimination
of the presumption of incapacity thereby withholding from the jury an unsatisfactory and

uncongenial task. The solution arrived at is the simple proposition providing that criminal
capacity shall not be deemed to exist below the age of thirteen. Persons falling in this
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amended this revision in 1967 to raise the age from seven to fourteen5 7
Texas raised the age from ten to fifteen in 19675 In New Jersey, the

change came in 1954 when the state supreme court rejected a prior
interpretation which held that a child seven and over could be

prosecuted criminally for murder and ruled instead to uphold the
statute which made a child under sixteen incapable of murder

9

This

then would be consistent with the Model Penal Code's recommended
age of sixteen for immaturity excluding criminal conviction0 1
These states and the others which have increased the age of

incapacity have shown confidence in their juvenile court system by
choosing redemption over punishment. Whether the juvenile court has

been given the staff, facilities and resources to redeem is another
question. The upward shift in the age of criminal responsibility may
indicate that the states are willing to take a less punitive approach to
the juvenile murderer.
category and committing acts which would otherwise be criminal thus fall within the
exclusive cognizance of the Family Court to be treated according to the provisions of the
Family Court Act. . . . Persons thirteen years of age and over are treated as possessing
criminal capacity. This does not mean, of course, that all children in the latter category will
be tried in the criminal courts. Selection of persons for treatment in the Family Court until
they have reached the ages of seventeen or eighteen will continue to be governed by the same
critena that presently obtain.
Id., comment at 211.
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